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ABSTRACT
Website Fingerprinting (WF) is a type of traffic analysis attack that
enables a local passive eavesdropper to infer the victim’s activity
even when the traffic is protected by encryption, a VPN, or an
anonymity system like Tor. Leveraging a deep-learning classifier,
a WF attacker can gain over 98% accuracy on Tor traffic. Existing
WF defenses are either very expensive in terms of bandwidth and
latency overheads (e.g. two-to-three times as large or slow) or inef-
fective against the latest attacks. In this paper, we explore a novel
defense, Mockingbird, based on the idea of adversarial examples
that have been shown to undermine machine-learning classifiers
in other domains. Since the attacker gets to design his classifier
based on the defense design, we first demonstrate that at least one
technique for generating adversarial-example based traces fails to
protect against an attacker using adversarial training for robust
classification. We then propose Mockingbird, a technique for gener-
ating traces that resists adversarial training by moving randomly
in the space of viable traces and not following more predictable
gradients. The technique drops the accuracy of the state-of-the-art
attack hardened with adversarial training from 98% to as low as 29%
while incurring only 56% bandwidth overhead. The attack accuracy
is generally lower than state-of-the-art defenses, and much lower
when considering Top-2 accuracy, while incurring lower overheads
in most settings.
KEYWORDS
Anonymity System; Defense; Privacy; Website Fingerprinting; Ad-
versarial Machine Learning; Deep Learning;
1 INTRODUCTION
The Tor anonymity system is vulnerable to traffic analysis attacks.
One such attack isWebsite Fingerprinting (WF), which enables an
eavesdropper between the client and the first Tor node on her path
to identify which websites the client is visiting. Figure 1 shows aWF
attack model in the Tor network. This local passive adversary could
be sniffing the client’s wireless connection, have compromised her
cable/DSL modem, or gotten access to the client’s ISP or workplace
network.
∗The authors contribute equally to this paper.
The WF attack can be modeled as a supervised classification
problem, in which the website domain names are labels and each
traffic trace is an instance to be classified or used for training.
Recently proposedWF attacks have used deep-learning classifiers to
great success. The state-of-the-art WF attacks, Deep Fingerprinting
(DF) [36] and Var-CNN [4], utilize convolutional neural networks
(CNN) to identify obtuse patterns in traffic data. These attacks can
achieve above 98% accuracy to identify sites using undefended
traffic in a closed-world setting [4, 36], and both attacks achieve
high precision and recall in the more realistic open-world setting.
In response to the threat of WF attacks [2, 15, 26, 33, 34, 36,
38], there have been numerous defenses proposed [5, 6, 17, 21, 24,
30, 39, 40]. WF defenses perturb the traffic so as to hide patterns
and confound the classifier. Recently, two relatively lightweight
defenses have been proposed, WTF-PAD [17] and Walkie-Talkie
(W-T) [39]. WTF-PAD offers lower overheads and is considered to
be a leading candidate for deployment in Tor [31]. Recent state-of-
the-art attacks, however, show that WTF-PAD is ineffective with
these attacks achieving over 90% accuracy in the closed-world1 [4,
36]. Furthermore, DF attack is able to reliably narrow down site
identities to two candidates when pitted against the W-T defense,
achieving a Top-2 accuracy of 98% [36]. These issues havemotivated
the need for new defenses that perform well against these state-of-
the-art deep-learning based attacks.
In this paper, we introduceMockingbird,2 a new defense strategy
using adversarial examples generated by a deep neural network.
There are various techniques to generate these examples in the
context of image classification [8, 23, 27, 28, 37], however most of
them perform a search in the space of possible images. Starting with
the original image, the search moves gradually towards a slightly
modified image that is classified differently from the source. This
search is typically guided by the gradient of the neural network’s
loss function or the logits, the inputs to the neural network’s final
layer for classification decision. Adversarial examples generated
by these methods have had tremendous success in fooling deep-
learning models to misclassify with as much as 100% effectiveness
1WF attacks are evaluated in either the closed-world or open-world settings. The closed-
world setting makes assumptions that benefit the attacker, whereas the open-world
setting relaxes these assumptions and is more indicative of real-world performance.
2The Northern mockingbird imperfectly but effectively imitates the calls of a wide
range of other birds, and one of its call types is known as a chatburst that it uses for
territorial defense: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Northern_mockingbird.
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and low amounts of distortion in the images [9]. This makes adver-
sarial examples intriguing for defending against WF attacks using
deep learning, as they could fool the classifier without adding large
amounts of distortion in the form of padding or delay.
While neural networks can be made more robust against adver-
sarial examples, most of these techniques are not effective upon
careful analysis [3, 7] or do not generalize to new approaches to
generating the examples [32]. In the WF context, however, the WF
attacker has the advantage of being able to generate adversarial
examples using the same technique as the defender. In particular,
he can use the defense as an oracle to generate these traces and
use them to train his classifier to be more robust. This adversarial
training approach has been shown to be effective when the classifier
knows how the adversarial traces are being generated [18].
To address this, we propose a novel technique to generate ad-
versarial traces that seeks to limit the effectiveness of adversarial
training by increasing the randomness of the search process and
reducing the influence of the design and training of the neural
network in finding a good adversarial example. In particular, as
we search for the new trace, we select a random target trace and
gradually reduce the distance to the target. We also change to other
randomly selected targets multiple times during the search. The
neural network is only used to give a confidence value on whether
the current trace fools the classifier, and we do not access the loss
function, the logits, or any other aspect of the neural network. The
resulting adversarial traces can go in many different directions
from the original source traces instead of consistently following the
same paths that result from, e.g., following the gradient of the loss
function. In this way, the technique selects paths that are hard to
find through adversarial training. Further, each new trace generated
from the same source typically ends near a different target each
time, helping to reduce the attacker’s top-2 accuracy.
With this technique, Mockingbird reliably causes misclassifica-
tion in a deep-learning classifier hardened with adversarial training
using only moderate amounts of bandwidth overhead.
The key contributions of this work are as follows:
• We are the first to leverage the concept of adversarial examples
in defending anonymous network traffic fromWF attacks with
our Mockingbird defense.
• We show how the state-of-the-art algorithms in generating
adversarial examples in computer vision fail as a defense in
the WF setting.
• WeevaluateMockingbird and find thatMockingbirdsignificantly
reduces accuracy of the state-of-the-art WF attack hardened
with adversarial training from 98% to 29%-57%, depending on
the scenario. The bandwidth overhead is 57% for full-duplex
traffic with no added delays, which is better than both W-T
and WTF-PAD.
• We show that it is difficult for an attacker to scope down to
just two sites against our defense. The state-of-the-art attack
can reach at most 57% Top-2 accuracy against our defense,
while the Top-2 accuracy on W-T and WTF-PAD is 97% and
90%, respectively.
• Using theWeFDE framework [19], wemeasure the information
leakage of our defense, and find that Mockingbird has less
leakage for many types of features than either W-T or WTF-
PAD.
We note that Mockingbird has significant implementation chal-
lenges, perhaps most importantly that finding suitable traces re-
quires significant computational time. At a minimum, Mocking-
bird has potential for use in server-side WF defenses [11], in which
the computation need only be done once for each significant change
to the site. Additionally, this work serves as a potential first step
towards more practical general-purpose defenses that build on our
findings.
2 THREAT & DEFENSE MODEL
2.1 Threat Model
We assume that the client browses the Internet through the Tor
network to hide her activities (see Figure 1). The adversary of
interest is local, which means the attacker is positioned somewhere
in the network between the client and Tor guard node. The attacker
is assumed to already know the identity of the client. His goal is
to detect the websites that the client is visiting. A local adversary
can be an eavesdropper on the user’s local network, local system
administrators, Internet Service Providers, any networks between
the user and the entry node, or the operator of the entry node. The
attacker is passive, meaning that the he only observes and records
the traffic traces that pass through the network. He does not have
the ability to drop, delay, or modify real packets in the traffic stream.
In a website fingerprinting (WF) attack, the attacker feeds the
collected network traffic into a trained machine-learning or deep-
learning classifier. For the purpose of training, the WF attacker
needs to collect traffic of various sites as a client of Tor network.
The attacker must deal with the limitation that it is not feasible to
collect the network traffic of all the sites on the web. To address this,
the attacker identifies a set ofmonitored sites that he wants to track.
The attacker limits the scope of his attack to the identification of
any website visits that are within the monitored set. The set of all
other sites is known as the unmonitored set.
WF attacks and defenses are evaluated in two different settings:
closed-world and open-world. In the closed-world setting, we as-
sume that the client is limited to visiting only the monitored sites.
The training and testing set used by the attacker only include sam-
ples from the monitored set. The closed-world scenario models an
ideal setting for the attacker and is not indicative of the attack’s
real-world performance. From the perspective of developing a WF
defense, defeating a closed-world attack means potentially defeat-
ing the attacker from the most advantageous situation.
In contrast, the open-world scenario models a more realistic
setting in which the client may visit websites from both the moni-
tored and unmonitored sites. In this setting, the attacker trains on
the monitored sites and a representative (but not comprehensive)
sample of unmonitored sites. The open-world classifier is then eval-
uated against both monitored and unmonitored sites, where the set
of unmonitored sites used for testing does not intersect with the
training set.
2.2 Defense Model
The purpose of a WF defense is to make a traffic trace of one site
indistinguishable from traces of other sites. To achieve this, the real
2
Figure 1: Website Fingerprinting Attack Model.
traffic stream must be manipulated in some way. Because traffic is
bidirectional, the deployment of a successful WF defense requires
participation from both the client and a cooperating node. It is
difficult, if not impossible, for the client to defend their traffic alone
as they have control over only outgoing traffic in the communi-
cation stream. To defend both directions in the network stream,
the client must have the cooperation of one of the nodes in its
Tor circuit. We call this cooperating node the bridge.3 The bridge
must be located somewhere between the adversary and the client’s
destination server so that the adversary only has access to the ob-
fuscated traffic stream. However, the guard node has knowledge
about the identity of the client and is in a position to act as a WF
adversary. Therefore, it would be ideal to set up the bridge at the
middle node, which cannot directly identify the client.
3 BACKGROUND & RELATEDWORK
3.1 WF Attacks
Website fingerprinting attacks have applied a variety of classifiers.
The three best attacks based on manual feature engineering are
k-NN [38], CUMUL [26], and k-FP [15], which all reached over
90% accuracy in closed-world tests on datasets with 100 samples
per site. In the rest of this section, we examine the more recent
deep-learning-based WF attacks.
SDAE. Recently, deep-learning techniques have attracted the at-
tention of privacy researchers due to their excellent performance in
image recognition tasks. The first to investigate their usage for WF
was Abe and Goto [2] who developed an attack based on Stacked
Denoising Autoencoders (SDAE). Unlike prior work, their attack
did not utilize handcrafted features. Rather, their model was trained
on the raw packet direction, represented by a sequence of "+1" and
"-1" values for outgoing and incoming packets, respectively. Despite
this innovation, their attack achieved a lower accuracy rate than
the previous state-of-the-art attacks at only 88% in the closed-world
setting.
Automated Website Fingerprinting (AWF). Rimmer et al. [34] pro-
posed using deep learning to bypass the feature engineering phase
of traditional WF attacks. To more effectively utilize DL techniques,
they collected a larger dataset of 900 sites with 2,500 trace instances
per site. They applied several different DL architectures—SDAE,
Convolutional Neural Network (CNN), and Long Short-Term Mem-
ory (LSTM)—on the traffic traces. They found that their CNNmodel
3Tor bridges are usually used for evading censorship, but they can be used for proto-
typing WF defenses such as used in WTF-PAD [17].
outperforms the other DL models they developed, obtaining 96%
accuracy in the closed-world setting.
Deep Fingerprinting (DF). Sirinam et al. [36] further developed
a deep CNN model that could outperform all the previous mod-
els, reaching up to 98% accuracy rate in the closed-world setting.
They evaluated their attack against a dataset of 100 sites with
1,000 instances each. They also examined the effectiveness of their
model against WF defenses, where they showed that their model
can achieve concerningly high performance against even some de-
fended traffic. Most notably, their attack achieved 90% accuracy
against WTF-PAD [17], the most likely WF defense to be deployed
on Tor, and 98% Top-2 accuracy against Walkie-Talkie [39].
Var-CNN. Recently Bhat et al. [4] developed a more sophisticated
CNN basedWF attack with reference to a ResNet based architecture.
In particular, Var-CNN shows attack effectiveness achieving 98.8%
accuracy. For our defense evaluation, we evaluated against the DF
model instead of Var-CNN model.
3.2 WF Defenses
In an effort to defeat WF attackers, researchers have explored vari-
ous defense designs that generate cover traffic to hide the features
present in website traffic. WF defenses are able to manipulate the
traffic stream with two operations: sending dummy packets and de-
laying real packets. These manipulations, however, come at a cost:
sending dummy packets adds an additional bandwidth overhead
to the network, while delaying packets adds latency overhead that
directly impacts the time required to load the page. Several studies
have thus tried to balance the trade-off between the WF defense’s
overhead and efficacy of the defense against WF attacks. In this
section, we review these WF defenses.
Constant-rate padding defenses. This family of defenses transmits
traffic at a constant rate in order to normalize trace characteristics.
BuFLO [12] is the first defense of this kind, and it sends the packets
in the same constant rate in both directions. The defense ends
transmission after the page has finished loading and a minimum
amount of time has passed. The overhead of the traffic is governed
by both the transmission rate and the minimum time threshold for
the stopping condition. Moreover, although the defense covers fine-
grained features like burst information, the course-grained features
like the volume and load time of the page still leak information about
the website. Tamaraw [6] and CS-BuFLO [5] extend the BuFLO
design with the goal of addressing these issues. To provide better
cover traffic, after the page is loaded, Tamaraw keeps padding
until the total number of transmitted bytes is a multiple of a fixed
parameter. Similarly, CS-BuFLO pads the traffic to a power of two,
or to a multiple of the power of the amount of transmitted bytes.
BuFLO family defenses are expensive, requiring two to three times
as much time as Tor to fetch a typical site and more than 100%
bandwidth overhead.
Supersequence defenses. This family of defenses depends on finding
a supersequence for traffic traces. To do this, these defenses first
cluster websites into anonymity sets and then find a representa-
tive sequence for each cluster such that it contains all the traffic
sequences. All the websites that belong to the same cluster are then
molded to the representative supersequence. This family includes
3
Supersequence [38], Glove [25], and Walkie-Talkie [39]. Superse-
quence and Glove use approximation algorithms to estimate the
supersequence of a set of sites. The traces are then padded in such a
way so as to be equivalent to its supersequence. However, applying
the molding directly to the cell sequences creates high bandwidth
and latency costs. Walkie-Talkie (WT) differs from the other two
defenses in that it uses anonymity sets of just two sites, and traces
are represented as burst sequences rather than cell sequences. Even
with anonymity sets of sizes of just two, this produces a theoretical
maximum accuracy of 50% . Wang and Goldberg report just 31%
bandwidth overhead for their defense, but also 34% latency over-
head due to the use of half-duplex communication. Then Sirinam
et al. [36] achieved 49.7% attack accuracy against WT.
Adaptive Padding (AP). Shmatikov and Wang [35] proposed Adap-
tive Padding (AP) as a countermeasure against end-to-end traffic
analysis. Juarez et al. [17] extended the idea of AP and proposed
the WTF-PAD defense as an adaptation of AP to protect Tor traffic
against WF attacks. WTF-PAD tries to fill in large delays between
packets (inter-packet arrival times). Whenever there is a large inter-
packet arrival time (where "large" is determined probabilistically),
WTF-PAD sends a fake burst of dummy packets. This approach
does not add any artificial delays to the traffic. Juarez et al. show
that WTF-PAD can drop the accuracy of the k-NN attack from 92%
to 17% with a cost of 60% bandwidth overhead. Sirinam et al. [36],
however, show that their DF attack can achieve up to 90% accuracy
against WTF-PAD in the closed-world setting.
Application-level defenses. Cherubin et al. [11] propose the first WF
defenses designed to work at the application layer. They proposed
two defenses in their work. The first of these defenses, ALPaCA,
operates on the webserver of destination websites. ALPaCA works
by altering the size distribution for each content type, e.g. PNG,
HTML, CSS, to match the profile for an average onion site. In the
best case, this defense has 41% latency overhead and 44% bandwidth
overhead and reduces the accuracy of the CUMUL attack from
56% to 33%. Their second defense, LLaMA, operates on the client
exclusively. This defense adds random delays to HTTP requests in
an effort to affect the order of the packets by manipulating HTTP
request and responses patterns. LLaMA drops the accuracy of the
CUMUL attack on Onion Sites from 56% to 34% at cost of 9% latency
overhead and 7% bandwidth overhead.
4 DEFENSE DESIGN
We now motivate and describe the design of the Mockingbird de-
fense, starting with a brief background on adversarial examples
and adversarial training, then showing the limitations of applying
existing techniques for generating adversarial examples, and finally
showing the Mockingbird design in detail.
4.1 Adversarial Examples & Adversarial
Training
Adversarial Examples. Szegedy et al. [37] were the first to dis-
cover that otherwise accurate ML and DL image classification mod-
els could be given image inputs with slight perturbations that would
be largely imperceptible to humans however completely misclassi-
fied by the models. These perturbed inputs are called adversarial
examples, and they call into question the robustness of many of
the advances being made in machine learning. The state-of-the-art
DL models can be fooled into misclassifying adversarial examples
with surprisingly high confidence. For example, Papernot et al. [27]
show that adversarial images cause a targeted deep neural network
to misclassify 84% of the time.
The idea of creating adversarial examples is to modify samples
from one class to make them be misclassified to another class where
the amount of modification is limited. More precisely, given an input
sample x and target class t such that the original class of x and the
target class t are not the sameC∗(x) , t , the goal is to find x ′ which
is close to x according to some distance metrics and C(x ′) = t .
In this case, x ′ is called a targeted adversarial example since it is
misclassified to a particular target label t. However, if an adversarial
example x ′ may be misclassified to any other classes except the
true class (C∗(x)), it is called an untargeted adversarial example.
In response to the adversarial examples, many defense tech-
niques have been introduced to make classifiers more robust against
being fooled. Recent research [3, 9] shows that almost none of these
recent defense techniques are effective. In particular, we can gen-
erate adversarial examples that counter these defense techniques
by including the defense techniques directly into the optimization
algorithm used to create the adversarial examples. We can also over-
come many defense approaches by simply increasing the amount
of perturbation used [7].
Adversarial Training. Recent research shows that adversarial
training increases the robustness of a model by incorporating ad-
versarial examples in the training data [18, 22]. The idea is to train
a network with adversarial examples so that they can be classified
correctly. This approach is limited, as it does not adapt well to
techniques for generating adversarial examples that haven’t been
trained on. In the WF setting, however, the classifier has the advan-
tage of knowing how the adversarial examples are being generated,
as they would be part of the open-source Tor code. Thus, adversarial
training is a significant concern for our system.
4.2 Adversarial Examples as a WF Denfense
Figure 2: A visualization of bursts, with six outgoing bursts
interspersed with six incoming bursts.
As we mentioned in above section, adversarial examples are
generated from the distribution of correctly classified samples with
slight perturbations. Moreover, adversarial examples have decent
resistance against the existing defenses and they can remain un-
detectable. These two properties are compelling for developing a
WF defense. In addition, adversarial examples can be general and
transferable in that the adversarial examples crafted for a certain
4
model may also be misclassified in other models that were trained
on different subsets of the data.
From the perspective of developing a WF defense, the goal is to
insert dummy packets to the original network traffic to fool the
trained WF classifier. The number of dummy packets in the traffic
should be as small as possible to keep bandwidth consumption low.
These two goals of WF defenses, high rates of misclassification
and low overhead, correspond to the two compelling properties of
adversarial examples, which are to fool the classifier with transfer-
ablity using relatively small perturbations. Therefore, we propose
to use the method of generating adversarial examples as a method
of WF defense.
To develop a WF defense based on the adversarial examples, first
we need to create a representation for the traffic traces to apply the
adversarial examples algorithms to them. We model the traffic trace
as a sequence of incoming (server to client) and outgoing (client
to server) bursts. We define a burst as a sequence of consecutive
packets in the same direction (see Figure 2). Given this, we can
increase the length of any burst by sending padding packets in the
direction of the burst. We cannot, however, decrease the size of
the bursts by dropping real packets due to the retransmissions this
would cause, changing the traffic patterns and adding delays for
the user.
4.3 Existing Methods as a WF Defense
Several different algorithms have been proposed for generating
adversarial examples within the field of computer vision, including
the Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [13], the Jacobian-Based
Saliency Map Attack (JSMA) [28], and optimization-based meth-
ods [9, 20]. For our initial exploration of adversarial examples in
WF defense, we examine the technique proposed by Carlini and
Wagner.
In 2017, Carlini and Wagner proposed a powerful optimization-
based algorithm to generate adversarial examples [8]. This method
was shown to defeat the defensive distillation approach of blocking
adversarial examples [29]. The algorithm is successful with 100%
probability. We modified their technique to suit our needs to gen-
erate adversarial traces out of the burst sequences. This algorithm
is designed to work on images, which are 2D, so we modified it to
work on the 1D traffic traces.
Given a sample x and a model F , the algorithm finds a pertur-
bation δ that makes x ′ = x + δ to be misclassified to any other
class than C(x) (C(x) = arдmax iF (x)i ), or in the case of a targeted
attack, it is classified to target class t . The algorithm tries to find
x ′ that is similar to x based on distance metric D. The distance
metrics can be an Lp -norm such as L0, L2, or L∞. The algorithm is
formulated as follows:
min ∥ δ ∥p + c . f (x + δ )
such that x + δ ∈ [0, 1]n (1)
The algorithm will find δ such that it minimizes the distance
metric, which is lp norm, and the objective function f (x + δ ). c is a
constant to scale both the distance metric and objective function in
the same range. Carlini and Wagner [8] used binary search to find
the proper value for c . They explored several objective functions
and found two taht work the best. For a targeted attack scenarios
with target class t , the best objective function is:
f (x ′) = max
i,t
(F (x ′)i ) − F (x ′)t (2)
For non-targeted attack scenarios where the true class for sample
x is class y, the best objective function is:
f (x ′) = F (x ′)y −maxi,y (F (x
′)i ) (3)
We evaluated the performance of this technique in two differ-
ent WF attack scenarios: without-adversarial-training and with-
adversarial-training. The without-adversarial-training scenario rep-
resents the scenario most typically seen in the adversarial example
literature, in which the classifier has not been trained on any ad-
versarial instances. In this scenario, we generated the adversarial
examples against a target model and tested them against the differ-
entWF attacks trained on the original traffic traces. We find that our
adversarial traces are highly effective against the WF attacks. The
accuracy of DF [36], the state-of-the-art deep-learning attack, is re-
duced from 98% to 3%, and the accuracy of CUMUL [26] drops from
92% to 31%. Our adversarial traces generated using this method are
highly transferable, as we generated them against a target CNN
model and they are effective against both DF and CUMUL. The full
details of these evaluations can be found in Appendix A.1.
This scenario is not realistic, unfortunately, as it is likely (and
usually assumed) that the attacker can discern what type of de-
fense is in effect and train on representative samples. This scenario
was examined in the with-adversarial-training evaluations. When
evaluated under this scenario, Carlini and Wagner’s technique fails
completely with 97% attack accuracy. The full details of these eval-
uations can be found in Appendix A.2. In addition, we also investi-
gated a tuned C&Wmethod for generating adversarial traces which
also show ineffectiveness as a WF defense. We discuss the tuned
C&W in Appendix B.
The results of this evaluation led to a very important insight:
the scenario in which the effectiveness of adversarial examples are
typically evaluated is notably different than that of a WF defense.
Thus, the techniques that excel at producing adversarial examples
for traditional attacks are poorly suited for our problem. In response
to this discovery, we focused our efforts on the development of a
new technique designed specifically for our needs. We discuss our
method in the following section.
4.4 Generating Adversarial Traces
Wenow introduceMockingbird, a novel algorithm to generate adver-
sarial traces that more reliably fool the classifier in the adversarial
training setting. The ultimate goal is to generate untargeted ad-
versarial traces that cause the classifier to label a traffic trace as
coming from any other site except the original site, i.e. to generate
an untargeted sample.
To defend a given trace, the source sample, Mockingbird first
generates a set of potential target traces selected randomly from the
traces of various sites other than the source site. It then randomly
picks one of these traces as the target sample and gradually changes
the source sample to get closer to the target sample. The process
stops when a trained classifier called the detector determines that
the class of the sample has changed (see Figure 3). Note that it does
not need to have changed to the target sample’s class, as the goal is
5
Figure 3:Mockingbird Architecture.
to generate an untargeted adversarial trace. The amount of change
applied to the source sample governs the bandwidth overhead of
Mockingbird, and as such should be minimized.
Unlike most other algorithms used to generate adversarial exam-
ples, Mockingbird does not focus on the loss function (like FGSM
and IGSM) or logits (like Carlini &Wagner) of the detector network.
Instead, it aims to move the source sample towards the target sam-
ple and only uses the detector network to estimate the confidence
with which the trace is misclassified. This lessens the reliance on
the shape of the detector network and helps to generate adversarial
traces that are more robust against adversarial training.
Mockingbird Algorithm. We assume that we have a set of sensi-
tive sites S that we want to protect. We train a detector f (x) on a
set of data from S. We discuss the design and training of f (x) in
Section 5. We consider traffic trace Is as an instance of source class
s ∈ S. Our goal is to alter Is such that it is classified to any other
class t , t = f (Is ) and t , s .
Is is a sequence of the bursts, Is =
[
bI0,b
I
1, ...,b
I
n
]
, where n is the
length of the trace. The only allowed operation on a burstbIi is to add
some positive values δi >= 0 to that burst, bIi = b
I
i +δi . The reason
for using δi >= 0 is that we want to only increase the volume of
the bursts. If δi < 0, that would mean we should drop some packets
to reduce the burst volume, but dropping real packets means losing
data and requires re-transmission of the dropped packet. To protect
source sample Is , we first select τ potential target samples from
other classes ti , s . We then select the target t as the one nearest
to the source sample based on the l2 norm distance. This helps to
minimize overhead as we will move the source towards the target.
More formally, we pick a target pool Ps of p random samples from
other classes, Ps =
[
I00, I11, .., Ipm
]
, where I j i is the j-th sample in
the target pool and belongs to target class ti , s . The target sample
It is selected as shown in Equation 4.
It = argmin
I ∈Ps
D(Is , I ) (4)
D(x ,y) = l2(x − y) (5)
To make the source sample leave the source class, we change
it with the minimum amount of perturbation in the direction that
makes it closer to the target (It ). We define ∆ as the perturbation
vector that we will add to the source sample to generate its defended
form Inews .
∆ = [δ0,δ1, · · · ,δn ] (δi >= 0) (6)
Inews = Is + ∆ (7)
We need to find a ∆ that adds the least amount of perturbation to
the source sample while still making it closer to the target sample.
Therefore, we find ∆ that minimizes distance D(Inews , IT ). To do so,
we compute the gradient of the distance with respect to the input.
Note that most work in adversarial example generation uses the
gradient of the loss function of the discriminator network rather
than distance, and this may make those techniques more sensitive
to the design and training of the classifier. The gradient points in
the direction of steepest ascent, which would maximize the distance.
Therefore, we compute the gradient of the negative of the distance
with respect to the input, and we modify the source sample in that
direction towards the target sample. In particular:
∇(−D(I , IT )) = − ∂D(I , IT )
∂I
=
[
− ∂D(I , IT )
∂bi
]
i ∈[0, · · · ,n]
(8)
Where bi is the i-th burst in input I .
To modify the source sample, we change bursts such that their
corresponding values in ∇(−D(I , IT )) are positive. Our perturbation
vector ∆ is:
δi =
{
−α × ∂D(I, IT )
∂bi
− ∂D(I, IT )
∂bi
> 0
0 − ∂D(I, IT )
∂bi
⩽ 0
(9)
where α is the parameter that amplifies the output of the gradient.
The choice of α has an impact on the convergence and the band-
width overhead. If we pick a large value for α , we will take bigger
steps toward the target sample and add more overhead, while small
values of α require more iterations to converge. We modify the
source sample by summing it with ∆, (Inews = Is + ∆). We iterate
this process, computing ∆ for Is and updating the source sample
at each iteration until we leave the source class, f (Inews ) , s or
the number of iterations passes the maximum allowed iterations.
Note that at the end of each iteration, we update the current source
sample with the modified one, Is = Inews . Leaving the source class
means that we have less confidence on the source class. So we fix a
threshold value (τc = 0.01) for measuring the confidence. If the con-
fidence of the detector on the source class is less than the threshold
(fs (Inews ) < τc ), Mockingbird will stop changing the source sample
(Is ).
As we only increase the size of the bursts where − ∂D(I, IT )
∂bi
> 0,
we may run into cases that after some iterations ∇(−D(I , IT )) does
not have any positive values or all the positive values are extremely
small such that they do not make any significant changes to Is . In
such cases, if Inews − Is is smaller than a threshold τD = 0.0001 for
λ consecutive iterations (we used λ = 10), and we are still in the
source class, we select a new target. In particular, we effectively
restart the algorithm by picking a new pool of potential target
samples, selecting the nearest target from the pool, and continuing
the process. It is to note that, the source sample at this point is
already in the changed form Inews and the algorithm starts changing
from Inews . In this process, the confusion added by Mockingbird in
the final trace is proportional to the number of target changed to
reach into the final adversarial trace.
5 EVALUATION
5.1 Datasets
We apply our algorithm for generating adversarial examples on the
traffic traces on the burst level. We can get the burst sequence of
the traffic traces from both full-duplex (FD) and half-duplex (HD)
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Figure 4: The CDF of the umber of bursts in the full duplex
and half duplex traces.
communication modes. Walkie-Talkie (WT) [39] works on the half-
duplex communication and it finds the supersequence in the burst
level. In our experiments, we use burst sequences for both FD and
HD datasets.
Full-Duplex (FD) : We use the FD traffic traces provided by Sirinam
et al. [36]Their dataset has 95 classes with 1000 instances each. 95
sites are from the top 100 sites in Alexa [1]. We further process their
data by removing any instances with less than 50 packets and the
instances that start with incoming packet. After this processing, we
end up with 518 instances for each site. We also use the FD open-
world (OW) dataset from Sirinam et al. [36] in our experiments
which has 40,716 different sites with 1 instance each. We process
the OW dataset as well.
Half-Duplex (HD) : We use the HD dataset provided by Sirinam
et al. [36]. This dataset contains 100 sites which are also from top
100 sites in Alexa.com [1], with 900 instances for each class. We
preprocess this dataset in the same way we processed FD dataset.
After preprocessing, we ended up with 83 classes with 720 instances
per class. Moreover, they also have OW data of 40,000 sites with 1
instance each. We also process OW dataset. We use both of these
HD closed-world (CW) and OW datasets for our HD evaluations.
In order to use these datasets for our defense, further preprocess-
ing is required before we can use those in our models. The burst
sequences varies in size between different visits and sites. However,
the input to our models should be fixed in size. In consequence,
we must determine an ideal size of input and adjust our dataset to
this size. To do this, we consider the distribution of burst sequence
lengths within our datasets. Figure 4 shows the CDF of the burst
sequence lengths for both HD and FD datasets. The figure shows
that more than 80% of traces have less than 750 bursts for HD CW
dataset, and more than 80% of the traces for the CW FD dataset
has less than 500 bursts. We found that using input sizes of 750
bursts and 1500 bursts on both HD and HD datasets provides 1%
improvement on accuracy on DF attack.The differences between
the performances between the full size burst length and its short
form (750 bursts) would thus appear to be negligible. To decrease
the computational cost to generate adversarial examples, we use
the input size of 750 bursts for both FD and HD datasets in our
evaluations.
In our evaluation, we need to address the needs of both the
Mockingbird system and the adversary to have training data. We
Table 1: Dataset Split:Adv Set&Detector Set. FD: Full-Duplex,
HD: Half-Duplex, NC: Number of Classes, NI: Number of
Instances, CW: Closed-World, OW: Open-World.
Adv Set A Detector Set D CW OW
(NC × NI ) (NC × NI ) Total
FD 95×259 95×259 95×518 40,716
HD 83×360 83×360 83×720 40,000
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Figure 5: α Value for full-duplex: the accuracy and band-
width overhead of generated samples as α varies. Dashed
lines show the results of Case I and solid lines show the re-
sults of Case II.
thus break each dataset (full-duplex (FD) and half-duplex (HD))
into two non-overlapping sets: Adv Set A and Detector Set D (see
Table 1). The Adv Set and Detector Set both contains half of the
instances of each class. For FD data, each set contains 259 instances
from each of 95 classes, while for HD data, each set contains 83
classes each with 360 instances.
5.2 Experimental Method
Mockingbird needs to train a detector f (x)with instances of a variety
of sites to generate adversarial traces. We use the Deep Fingerprint-
ing (DF) CNN model designed by Sirinam et al. [36] as our detector
and train it on the traces of the Detector Set. Sirinam et al. suggest
using an input size of 5,000 packets, but our padded traces have
more traffic, so we use an input size of 10,000 packets, which is the
80th percentile of packet sequence lengths in our defended traces.
The Detector Set is only used to train the detector. The source sam-
ples from Adv Set (Is ∈ A) are used to generate adversarial traces
for the training, validation, and testing of the adversary’s classifier.
We also use DF as the primary attack classifier for most of our
experiments, as it is the state-of-the-art attack. Later, we show re-
sults using other attacks from the literature. In all of the evaluations
in this section, the classifier is trained using adversarial training,
where the attacker has full access to the defense and uses it to
generate defended samples for each class in the monitored set. We
also discuss the impact of using a less powerful detector (weaker
surrogate network) in Appendix C.
Evaluation Scenarios. Mockingbird changes the source sample
toward a target sample drawn randomly from our target pool. The
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Figure 6: α Value for half-duplex: the accuracy and band-
width overhead of generated samples as α varies. Dashed
lines show Case I and solid lines show Case II.
detector is responsible to verify whether the perturbed source sam-
ple is still in the source class. We are interested to know how the
algorithm performs if we fill the target pool with instances of sites
that the detector has been trained on and has not been trained on.
We examine the bandwidth overhead and reduction in the attack
accuracy of traces protected by our method in these two different
scenarios.
• Case I: We fill the target pool with instances from the Adv Set.
Therefore, both source samples (Is ∈ A) and target samples
(I j i ∈ A which Ti , s) are from the Adv Set. In this case, we
assume that the detector has been trained on the target classes,
which makes it more effective at identifying when the sample
has left one class for another. However, it may be less effective
if the adversary trains on the source class but none of the other
target classes used in detection.
• Case II:We fill the target pool with instances from unmonitored
sites that are not in the Adv Set. We select the target samples
(I j i ) from the open-world dataset. The source samples (Is )
are from Adv Set and we generate their defended forms. In
this case, we assume the detector has not been trained on the
target samples, so it may be less effective in identifying when
the sample leaves the class. That may make it more robust
when the attacker also trains on a different set of classes in his
monitored set.
We generate defended samples with various settings. We vary α
to evaluate their effect on the strength of the defended traces and
the overhead. We also vary the number of iterations required to
generate the adversarial traces. Each iteration moves the sample
closer to the target, improving the likelihood it is misclassified, but
also adds bandwidth overhead.
5.3 Experiments with Full-Duplex Data
The full-duplex version of Mockingbird is the easier to deploy and
leads to lower latency costs than the half-duplex version [39], so
we lead with the full-duplex results.
Choice of α Figure 5 shows the bandwidth overhead and attack
accuracy of full-duplex data with respect to α values for both Case
I (solid lines) and Case II (dashed lines) with 500 iterations. As
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Figure 7: Half-duplex: the attacker’s accuracy and the band-
width overhead of the generated samples as we vary the
number of iterations.
expected, the bandwidth overhead increases and the attack accu-
racy decreases as we increase α , with longer steps towards the
selected targets. For Case I, the adversary’s accuracy against Mock-
ingbirdwith α=5 and α=7 are both 35%, but the bandwidth overhead
is lower for α = 5 at 56% compared to 59% for α = 7. For Case II, the
adversary’s accuracy and the bandwidth overhead are both slightly
lower for α=5 than that of α=7.
As expected, we also observe that Case I leads to lower accuracy
and comparable bandwidth overhead to Case II. When α=5 and
α=7, the attack accuracies for Case I are at least 20% lower than
that of Case II. Therefore, picking target samples from classes that
the detector has been trained on drops the attacker’s accuracy.
Number of Iterations. Figure 8 shows the trade-off between the
accuracy and bandwidth overhead with respect to the number of
iterations to generate the adversarial traces. As mentioned earlier,
increasing the number of iterations also increases the number of
packets (overhead) in the defended traces. We vary the number of
iterations from 100 to 500 for both Case I (Figure 8a) and Case II
(Figure 8b) to see their impact on the overhead and the accuracy
rate of the DF attack.
For Case I, we can see that the DF attack accuracy for both 400
and 500 iterations is 35% when α=5, while the bandwidth overheads
are 54% and 56%, respectively. For α = 7, the attacker’s accuracy
is higher and the bandwidth costs are higher. For Case II, using
α=5 leads to 57% accuracy with 53% bandwidth overhead for 400
iterations and 55% accuracy and 56% bandwidth overhead for 500
iterations.
5.4 Experiments with Half-Duplex Data
Using half-duplex communication increases the complexity of de-
ployment and adds latency overhead [39], but it offers more precise
control over burst patterns such that we can achieve reduced at-
tacker accuracy as shown in the following results.
Choice of α . As seen in Figure 6 (all for 500 iterations), the lowest
accuracy rates are 35.5% and 28.8% for Case I and Case II, respec-
tively, when α=7. The bandwidth overheads are 62.7% and 73.5%
for Case I and Case II, respectively. When α=5, the attack accuracy
is 50% for both Case I and Case II with bandwidth overheads of 57%
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(a) Case I
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(b) Case II
Figure 8: Full-duplex: the attacker’s accuracy and the bandwidth overhead of the generated samples as we vary the number of
iterations.
Table 2: The Evaluation of theMockingbird against DF, AWF, CUMUL,k-FP, andk-NNAttacks &Comparison againstWTF-PAD
and W-T Defenses. S×I: Sites×Instances, BWO: Bandwidth Overhead, FD: Full-Duplex, HD: Half-Duplex.
Cases Dataset S×I BWO DF [36] AWF [34] CUMUL [26] k-FP [15] k-NN [38]
Undefended (FD) 95×259 - 0.95 0.88 0.93 0.85 0.86
Undefended (HD) 83×360 - 0.98 0.93 0.92 0.92 0.90
WTF-PAD [17] 95×463 0.640 0.85 0.39 0.55 0.44 0.17
W-T [39] 82×360 0.720 0.362 0.39 0.36 0.30 0.35
Case I Mockingbird (FD) 95×259 0.565 0.352 0.20 0.232 0.21 0.04
Mockingbird (HD) 83×360 0.627 0.355 0.27 0.300 0.33 0.06
Case II Mockingbird (FD) 95×259 0.565 0.555 0.34 0.368 0.34 0.06
Mockingbird (HD) 83×360 0.735 0.288 0.22 0.316 0.30 0.05
Table 3: Top-2 Accuracy of DF Attack against Mocking-
bird and W-T. FD: Full-duplex, HD: Half-Duplex.
Cases Dataset DF [36] Top-2 Accuracy
WTF-PAD [17] 0.897
W-T [39] 0.970
Case I Mockingbird (FD) 0.514
Mockingbird (HD) 0.528
Case II Mockingbird (FD) 0.569
Mockingbird (HD) 0.432
and 69%, respectively. As expected, higher α values mean lower
attacker accuracies at the cost of higher bandwidth. Additionally,
we note that as in the full-duplex setting, Case I provides lower
bandwidth overhead and lower detectability than Case II.
Number of Iterations. Figure 7 shows the trade-off between at-
tacker accuracy and bandwidth overhead with the number of itera-
tions for α=7. We vary the number of iterations from 100 to 500 for
both Case I and Case II. For Case I, the accuracy is 35.5% with 62.7%
bandwidth overhead with 500 iterations. With 400 iterations, the
accuracy is 37% with 59% bandwidth overhead. For Case II, with
500 iterations, we can get the lowest attack accuracy among all
the settings in our defense which is 28.8%, with a cost of 73.5%
bandwidth overhead. We can observe that the bandwidth overhead
for Case I is always lower than Case II.
5.5 Results Analysis
We show a comparison of attack accuracies of Mockingbird against
DF [36], AWF [34], CUMUL [26], k-FP [15], and k-NN [38] attacks
for both Case I and Case II in Table 2. We also show the comparison
of the performance of Mockingbird with two state-of-the-art de-
fenses WTF-PAD [17] and Walkie-Talkie (W-T) [39]. In Table 3, we
show the comparison of Top-2 accuracy ofMockingbird , WTF-PAD
defense, and W-T defense.
Bandwidth Overhead. As described in Section 4.4, we designed
Mockingbird to minimize packet addition by keeping the amount
of change in a trace by a threshold value of 0.0001. Keeping the
amount of change at a minimum keeps the bandwidth overhead as
low as possible. We show comparison against WTF-PAD and W-T
because these are the two lightweight and state-of-the-art defenses,
while the other proposed WF defenses have two-to-three times
higher delays and bandwidth overheads.
From Table 2, we can see that, with full-duplex (FD) network
traffic, the bandwidth overhead in Case I and Case II of Mock-
ingbird are the same 56.5% and at least 7% and 15% lower than
WTF-PAD and W-T, respectively. In contrast, the bandwidth over-
head for half-duplex (HD) network traffic is lower only for Case I
than WTF-PAD and W-T.
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In HD network traffic, Case II requires at least 10% higher band-
width overhead than Case I. In terms of bandwidth overhead, Case
I is better for both FD and HD network traffic, although not to a
significant degree. Overall, Case II for HD network traffic provides
the strongest defense (28.8% accuracy) but requires the highest cost
(73.5% bandwidth overhead) for any of the lightweight defenses.
In summary, our bandwidth overheads are better thanWTF-PAD
andW-T in most of the cases, except one. This amount of bandwidth
overhead can be acceptable in comparison to other WF defenses
for Tor.
Attack Accuracy. Interestingly, we observe that the accuracies of
the DF attack in Case I for both FD and HD network traffic are 35.2%
and 35.5%, respectively, indicating that DF attack fails against our
defense. In addition, the DF attack accuracies of Mockingbird are
significantly lower than that of WTF-PAD, and slightly lower than
that of W-T. More precisely, we can see from Table 2 that accuracies
are at least 49% and 0.5% lower than that of WTF-PAD and W-T.
In Case II, the accuracy of the DF attack against FD network
traffic is 55.5% which is higher than W-T but at least 34% lower
than WTF-PAD. Surprisingly, the HD adversarial traces provide the
best performance against the DF attack and can drastically drop the
accuracy down to 28.8%, showing that DF attack also fails against
Case II of our defense. In addition, the DF attack accuracy of Case
II HD is at least 56% and at least 7% lower than that of WTF-PAD
and W-T.
The AWF attack accuracies of Mockingbird for all the cases are
lower than that of WTF-PAD and W-T defenses. The highest accu-
racy of AWF ofMockingbird is 34% which is still 5% lower than that
of WTF-PAD and W-T defenses.
The CUMUL attack can achieve at best 36.8% accuracy against
FD network traffic of Case I. In all the other cases, the CUMUL
attack accuracies against our defense are closer to 30% or lower.
We also want to point out that, CUMUL attack accuracies against
our defense are lower than that of WTF-PAD and closer to W-T
(see Table 2). It is important to note that the CUMUL attack is
also unsuccessful against our defense. This results show that the
effectiveness of Mockingbird is not limited to only against the deep-
learning based DF attack, but also traditional machine-learning
based CUMUL attack.
Though our defense has lower accuracy than WTF-PAD against
k-FP attack, for two cases it is slightly higher than W-T, and and
for one case equal to W-T. However, k-NN performs worst against
our defense in all the cases than WTF-PAD and W-T.
It is also notable that both Case I and Case II provide consistencies
between the attack accuracies for both FD and HD network traffic
against all the attacks. It is interesting that all the attacks accuracies
against Case I FD is lower than that of Case I HD. On the other hand,
attacks accuracies against Case II FD is higher than that of Case II
HD. Overall, the results demonstrate that Mockingbird is effective
and has lower attack performance compared to the state-of-the-art
WF defenses, WTF-PAD and W-T.
Top-k Accuracy. In general, prior works have focused their anal-
ysis on Top-1 accuracy, which is normally referred to simply as the
accuracy of the attack. Top-1 accuracy, however, does not provide a
full picture of the effectiveness of a defense, as an attacker may use
additional insights about their target (language, locale, interests,
etc) to further deduce what website their target is likely to visit.
Furthermore, most WF defenses are evaluated in a simulated envi-
ronment like our own. These simulators abstract away networking
issues that may occur when the defense is implemented and limited
by real-world network conditions. These real-world limitations can
produce imperfections when applying the defense and may expose
the user to increased fingerprintability.
As such, it is desirable to examine the accuracy of Top-k predic-
tions, where k is the number of top-ranked classes in the prediction.
In evaluations of WF, we are particularly interested in the Top-2
accuracy. A high Top-2 accuracy indicates that the classifier is able
to reliably determine the identity of a trace to one of two candidate
websites. This is a threat to a user even when the attacker is unable
to use additional information to predict the true site. The knowl-
edge that the target may be visiting a sensitive site is actionable
and can encourage the attacker to expend additional resources to
further analyze their target.
To better evaluate the efficacy ofMockingbird against this threat,
we compute the Top-2 accuracy and compare it to that of WTF-PAD
and W-T. The results show that Mockingbird is somewhat resistant
to Top-2 identification, with an accuracy of 56.9% in the worst case.
On the other hand, W-T struggles in this scenario with 97% Top-2
accuracy as its defense design does not protect beyond confusion
between two classes. In addition, WTF-PAD also has a very high
89.7% Top-2 accuracy. This Top-2 accuracy ofMockingbird indicates
and ensures notably lower risk of de-anonymization of Tor client
than WTF-PAD and W-T.
We also analyze the Top-3 to Top-10 accuracy and discuss why
Mockingbird is good at restricting the Top-k accuracy in Appen-
dix D.
5.6 Information Leakage Analysis
Recent works have shown that classification accuracy is not a
complete metric to evaluate the objective efficacy of a WF de-
fense [10, 19]. To address this issue, we have adopted the WeFDE
information leakage estimation technique [19] for our defense’s
evaluation. The WeFDE technique allows us to determine how
many bits of information each feature leaks for a given defense.
The authors of the WeFDE paper made their code available to us,
and for speed and memory requirements, we re-implemented most
of the code ourselves and validated our common results against
theirs. We perform information leakage analysis on undefended
full-duplex traffic and defended traffic for 3043 features spread
across 14 categories. The defenses we examine are WTF-PAD, W-T,
and the full-duplex Case I variant of Mockingbird. The leakage for
each feature and defense is shown in Figure 9. It is to note that
our Timing and Pkt. per Second categories do not include W-T or
Mockingbird measurements as the simulations for these defenses
are unable to produce accurate timestamp estimations.
In general, we find that the information leakage of Mocking-
bird to be comparable to the other defenses. We find that any given
feature leaks at most 1.9 bits of information in Mockingbird. W-T
has similar maximum leakage, with at most 2.2 bits per feature,
while WTF-PAD leaks at most 2.6 bits. The maximum amount of
leakage seen for the undefended traffic was 3.4 bits, nearly twice
that ofMockingbird. Our defense seems to be most vulnerable to the
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Figure 9: Individual feature information leakage.
N -gram class of features, which is not surprising, as these features
seem to be effective for all traffic defenses we examined. On the
other hand, our defense is quite effective against packet count fea-
tures, which was previously the most significant class of features
for the undefended traffic and is also useful against W-T. Addition-
ally, Mockingbird shows notable improvements over W-T in the
Transposition, First 30, Last 30, and Burst features, while W-T is
better than Mockingbird in the Pkt. Distribution feature.
Overall, the results of our information leakage analysis are largely
in line with what we see in our Top-1 accuracy measurements:
W-T and Mockingbird achieve similar performance, with Mocking-
bird slightly edging out W-T.
6 DISCUSSION
6.1 Deployment Challenges
Generating adversarial examples for WF defense is different than
that of other domains such as computer vision or voice recognition.
The main challenges we face in crafting adversarial examples for
web traffic traces are as follows:
No Packet Dropping, only Insertion: Perturbation to traffic
traces can be done only through the sending of the dummy packets.
Dropping real packets to perturb the traffic trace is undesirable as
dropped packets will need to be re-queued before subsequent pack-
ets, causing time delays. To overcome this challenge, we introduce
constraints in our algorithm to insure that the packet burst sizes
are only ever increased (see Section 4.4).
Two Parties are Involved: Traffic traces are a combination of
download and upload streams. Neither the client nor the server has
a full control of both streams. Therefore, the WF defense has two
elements to control both sides of the traffic: the client side and a
bridge in the network. This dynamic imposes unique restrictions
on the implementation of our design which do no exist in other
domains for adversarial examples.
Crafting Adversarial Examples on the Fly: To craft the ad-
versarial examples from traffic traces, we have to deal with the
transmission of packets. Ideally, the traffic trace should be captured
packet by packet and the adversarial examples should be generated
in real time so that we can send and receive packets simultaneously.
In addition, as the entire trace is not accessible to the algorithm
during the application of the defense, the adversarial examples
should be generated on the fly. Furthermore, the client must use a
pre-trained detector that models the attacker when generating the
adversarial traces. These detectors are deep-learning classification
models, and consequently require significant computing capacity
to generate traces for each site visit.
6.2 Implementation & Deployment Plan
In order to deploy our defense in the realistic world, it is necessary
to address several outstanding issues.
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Live Trace Generation: Our investigations have yet to find a
solution which allows for live packet-by-packet generation of ad-
versarial traces. Consequently, our defense requires that the full
traffic burst sequence be known before generating an associated
adversarial example. This requires that the defense implementation
maintains a database of relatively recent reference burst sequences
for sites of interest. The responsibility for gathering and maintain-
ing this database would most appropriately be given to the Tor
network. In particular, special directory servers could be deployed
to maintain the database and distribute fresh reference sequences
periodically to clients. This same mechanism may be used to dis-
tribute the pre-trained detector models to clients. The clients can
then use this data to generate adversarial traces locally before each
site visit.
Padding Mechanism: Padding mechanisms must be designed so
they can manipulate a trace sequence to match an adversarial se-
quence. To address this problem, burst molding must be performed
by both the client and bridge, similar to that of the W-T defense.
Burst molding is difficult to achieve in a live setting as padding
must be added to the end of bursts, however, the end of a burst is
difficult to reliably identify. To address this, we propose that a burst
molding mechanism hold packets in a queue for each burst. The
queue is dumped onto the network only after a timeout threshold
expires after no additional packets are received from downstream.
The size of the next burst can be easily communicated from the
client to the bridge by embedding this information in the dummy
packets of the prior burst. In this way, bursts can be easily molded
to their appropriate size at the cost of some additional delay.
Computation Requirements: The adversarial trace generation
process currently requires several hundred iterations, where the ref-
erence trace is perturbed, and the resulting trace is checked against
the detector each iteration. For our defense to be deployable, the
full generation process must take at most a few seconds before each
visit. As previously noted, significant computation resources (e.g. a
dedicated GPU device) is currently necessary to generate within
our time limitations. Fortunately, there are possible solutions to
this problem. At the moment, our algorithm performs adversarial
trace generation using the state-of-the-art classifiers. These clas-
sifiers were designed to be used by comparatively high resource
attackers who have access to GPU arrays that a client would likely
not. This highlights a need for an alternative model that is more
efficient than its state-of-the-art brethren. Works in other domains
have explored techniques that allow models to be run efficiently
by low-resource entities such as mobile devices. Techniques such
as model compression [14] and data quantization [41] have been
shown to provide massive speedups in resource constrained envi-
ronments with relatively small performance degradation. These
techniques can be leveraged to create efficient detector models that
consumer-grade devices can easily run to generate traces.
6.3 Server-Side Defense
Cherubin et al. [11] proposed to apply website fingerprinting de-
fenses at the application layer, which is especially beneficial to
onion services that are accessed only through Tor. A server-side
application of Mockingbird could be an effective and practical way
to defend a site from attacks. It would involve the website oper-
ator running a tool to examine their site trace from Tor, running
Mockingbird to generate a set of effective traces, and then adding
dummy web objects and padding existing web objects to specific
sizes (following the techniques of Cherubin et al. [11]) to modify
the network trace as needed. A web server can generate traces as
needed during down times. Also, depending on the threat model of
the site, it may only need to create a new trace periodically, such as
once per day or per hour. At that rate of change, the attacker would
need to download a new set of traces very frequently, increasing
the attack cost and potentially making the attack less stealthy for
less popular onion sites.
7 CONCLUSION
We propose a novel WF defense, Mockingbird, that can fool the
state-of-the-art WF attack with a significant amount of reduced at-
tack accuracy. Our defense has lower bandwidth overhead than that
of WTF-PAD and Walkie-Talkie, the state-of-the-art lightweight
defenses. Mockingbird uses a novel mechanism that adapts tech-
niques to create adversarial traces against machine-learning and
deep-learning classifiers. It generates adversarial traces that can
significantly limit the ability of a WF adversary to distinguish a site,
even though the adversary adopts adversarial training to train his
classifier. Our defense mechanism results in 56% bandwidth over-
head and drops the accuracy of the state-of-the-art WF attack from
98% to 29%-57%, depending on the scenario. In addition, our defense
performs better than the two state-of-the-art defenses: WTF-PAD
and W-T. The Top-2 attack accuracy of our defense against the DF
attack is at most 57%, whereas it is 90% for WTF-PAD and 97% for
W-T. The results of information leakage analysis are in-line with our
previous conclusions when evaluating raw accuracy metrics. We
emphasize that our experiments are conducted in the closed-world
setting, where the attacker knows that the Tor client is assumed to
visit one of the monitored sites. In a more realistic open-world set-
ting, where the client could visit any site on the Web, 57% accuracy
is very likely to lead to many false positives for the attacker.
Although Mockingbird has implementation challenges that must
be addressed before it could be practically deployed in Tor, it shows
the significant potential of an approach inspired by adversarial ex-
amples. Furthermore, it may be possible to leverageMockingbird for
server-side defense in the near future.
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A PERFORMANCE OF C&WMETHOD
In order to evaluate the efficacy of the adversarial traces generated
by the Carlini and Wagner [8] method described in Section 4.3,
we consider two different attack scenarios based on when the de-
fenses are applied. The defense can be applied either after the
attack (Without-Adversarial-Training) or before the attack (With-
Adversarial-Training). We evaluate both scenarios in the following
sections. We use half-duplex (HD) closed-world dataset for these ex-
periments. We explain the pre-processing of the data in Section 5.1.
A.1 Without-Adversarial-Training
In this scenario, we assume that the attacker has trained its classifier
on the traces that have not been defended. We assume that the
attacker is not aware of a defense in place. Such a scenario can
be valid in the case that we have an attacker that does not target
any specific client and his goal is to identify the behavior of large
number of users, but some of the clients may use some defense to
protect their traffic.
For this scenario, we first train a classifier on our undefended
traces and then we generate the adversarial traces. We examine
the efficacy of the generated samples by testing them against the
trained attacker model.
In our evaluation we break the data into two sets, Adv Set, and
Detector Set, each set has 83 classes with 360 instances each. The
attacker trains the classifier on the Detector Set. The traces in Detec-
tor Set are not protected by any defenses. The WF attacks that we
apply on the Adv Set are the DF and CUMUL attacks. We chose DF
attack as a state-of-the-art WF attack representing deep-Learning
(DL) based WF attack and CUMUL attack as the representative
of the machine-learning (ML) based WF attack. CUMUL attack
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Table 6: The evaluation of the defenses against the state-of-
the-art WF attacks as the attackers are trained on the de-
fended traces. BWO: Bandwidth Overhead, CNN is the sim-
ple CNN of Table 4.
BWO CNN DF [36] CUMUL [26]
Undefended - 92% 98% 92%
Adversarial Traces 62% 91% 97% 91%
uses SVM classifier and has high performance compared to other
tradition WF attacks [36].
We apply the method described in 4.3 to generate adversarial
traces from the traces in Adv Set, we call these traces in our eval-
uation as Adversarial Traces. To generate Adversarial Traces, we
use a simple CNN as the target model (F) and the adversarial traces
will be generated based on this simple CNN. The architecture of
the simple CNN is shown in Table 4.
Table 4: Model Architecture of Simple CNN.
Layer type size
Convolution + ReLU 1 × 8 × 32
Convolution + ReLU 1 × 8 × 64
Convolution + ReLU 1 × 8 × 128
Fully Connected + ReLU 512
Fully Connected + Softmax number of classes
Table 5: The evaluation of the defenses against the state-of-
the-art WF attacks as the attackers are trained on the unde-
fended traces. BWO: Bandwidth Overhead, CNN is the sim-
ple CNN of Table 4.
BWO CNN DF [36] CUMUL [26]
Undefended - 92% 98% 92%
Adversarial Traces 62% 2% 3% 31%
Table 5 shows the results of our evaluations. Adversarial Traces
add 62% bandwidth overhead. Adversarial Traces generated for
Simple CNN can confound the target model 98% of the times. In
addition, the accuracy of DF and CUMUL attacks are 3% and 31%.
This means that Adversarial Traces generated based on a target
model with simple CNN architecture can be highly transferable to
other machine learning models. Almost all the adversarial traces
generated by simple CNN can confound DF attack, which is also a
deep learning model. The results show that the adversarial traces
are more transferable to DL model than traditional ML models.
A.2 With-Adversarial-Training
In this scenario, we assume that the attacker knows that the client
is using some sort of defense mechanisms to protect her traffic. The
attacker then collects the traces protected by the same method as
the client and trains his classifier with those traces. In this scenario,
the training set and testing set are both traces protected by the
same WF defense method. This scenario is more realistic because it
has been shown that the effectiveness of the WF attacks depends
on the attacker’s knowledge of the clients [16]. Moreover, once a
defense is deployed it is supposed to be accessible for all the users
and used by all the users. Therefore, the attacker can also use the
same defense as other clients.
For evaluation in this scenario, we protect the traces in Adv Set
by Adversarial Traces (described in Section 4.3 using a target model
with the architecture in Table 4). Then we train the simple CNN,
DF, and CUMUL attacks, on 90% defended traces and test them with
the remaining 10% of defended traces.
To generate Adversarial Traces, we train a target model with
the same architecture as simple CNN with the traces in Detector
Set and used in generating Adversarial Traces on Adv Set. The
results of the evaluation in this scenario are shown in Table 6. As
shown in the table, even when adversarial traces are generated
based on a target model with similar architecture as simple CNN,
they are highly detectable on simple CNN as we train simple CNN
on the adversarial traces, and its accuracy is 91%. Moreover, DF and
CUMUL attacks can also detect the adversarial traces with high
accuracy, 97% and 91%, respectively. This means that generated
adversarial traces are ineffective when the adversary adopts the
technique of adversarial training. Generating the adversarial traces
works like a data augmentation technique in this case. If the attacker
is trained on them, the attacker will detect them correctly. This
highlights the necessity of the creation of a new adversarial example
generation technique designed specifically for WF.
B TUNED C&WMETHOD
WealsomixedMockingbirdwith Carlini andWagner (C&W)method [8].
We only show the evaluation for half-duplex (HD) dataset. In this
implementation instead of gradient of distance, we optimized the
adversarial traces over the loss function. Let’s assume we have trace
Is (belonging to source class s) and the generated adversarial trace
is Inews :
Inews = Is + ∆ (10)
Where ∆ the perturbation added to the source trance. We define
∆ in a way that it does not add too much overhead:
∆ = δ2 ∗ scale (11)
Where δ is the perturbation optimized by the algorithm and
the scale is a variable to adjust the overhead not to go above a
maximum allowed overhead. The power 2 is to force only positive
perturbations. We define constant variableMAX as the maximum
allowed overhead to the traces. MAX should be between 0 and 1
which lead to 0 to 100% bandwidth overhead, respectively.
S = (1 +MAX ) ∗ Size(Is ) − Size(Inews )
I f I =
[
bI0,b
I
1, ...,b
I
n
]
then
Size(I ) =
n∑
i=1
bi (12)
scale =min(1, S
Size(∆) ) (13)
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Figure 11: Weak Detector: Half-duplex Performance. x-axis
represents the Top-k where k=1....10 and y-axis represents
the attack accuracy.
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Figure 10: DF attack accuracy as k (the number of iterations)
varies.
Given a sample Is and a model F , the algorithm finds a perturba-
tion δ that makes Inews = Is + ∆ to be misclassified to target class t .
The algorithm tries to find Inews that is similar to Is . The algorithm
will find δ such that it minimizes the objective function f (Inews ).
C&W [8] explored several objective functions and found that the
best objective function is:
f (Inews ) = maxi,t (F (I
new
s )i ) − F (Inews )t (14)
For each source trace Is , we pick a target class t . We keep min-
imizing the objective function till Inews is classified as class t for
maximum k iterations. At the end of k iterations, if Inews is still
not in class t , we change target t to another class and minimize
the objective function over the new target. We change the target
maximum T times.
The architecture of our surrogate network is shown in Table 4.
This surrogate network works as the detector (or model F ). We
trained the detector on Detector Set D and generate adversarial
traces on Adv SetA on our half-duplex dataset. Figure 10 shows the
accuracy of the DF attack on generated adversarial traces compared
to W-T and Mockingbird HD. In this experiment we setMAX equal
to 0.5 and 0.7 which lead to overhead 50% and 70%, respectively.
We kept the maximum target change,T , fixed as 8 and changed the
maximum iteration of iterations k .
C WEAKER SURROGATE NETWORK
One of the concerns of generating adversarial traces with respect
to a powerful detector is that the powerful detector today can be
obsolete tomorrow and a more powerful attack might make this
defense ineffective. To address this concern, we generate adversarial
traces with respect to a very week detector. However, we still use a
powerful attack model DF for adversarial training. The architecture
of this detector is shown in Table 4. We only show the experimental
results for half-duplex dataset. Our results show that our defense
remain effective even though we use a weak surrogate network.
The bandwidth overheads for Case I and Case II is 62% and 73%,
respectively. The Top-1 attack accuracy is 35% and 29% for Case I
and Case II, respectively. We can see the Top-1 to Top-10 accuracy
in Figure 11. Top-10 accuracy for both Case I and Case II is lower
than 90%. In particular, Top-10 accuracies for both Case I and Case
II are 86% and 81%, respectively.
D ANALYSIS OF TOP-K ACCURACY
Figure 12: Top-k Accuracy: full-duplex and half-duplex. x-
axis represents the Top-k where k=1....10 and y-axis repre-
sents the attack accuracy. Red and Green solid line repre-
sents the results for full-duplex dataset and dashed line rep-
resents the results for half-duplex dataset.
We can see from Figure 12 thatMockingbird can limit the Top-10
accuracies of full-duplex (FD) data to 84% and 92% for Case I and
Case II, respectively. For half-duplex (HD), Top-10 accuracies are
86% and 80% for Case I and Case II. These set of results show that
Mockingbird is better to limit the Top-k accuracy to a significant
degree than that of W-T and WTF-PAD defenses. Mockingbird is
doing such a good job because of the way it picks a target trace.
Robust randomness to pick a target trace and the role of detector
enables Mockingbird to be resistant to Top-k accuracy. We mention
in our defense design that Mockingbird picks a new target trace
each time detector indicates the adversarial sample confidence is
not lower than a threshold value. In this way, the final generated
adversarial trace is a result of picking multiple target trace. We
visualize the total number of changes of the target trace for both
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Figure 13: Total Number Target Changes for both HD and
FD dataset.
Figure 14: Site-5: Number of Target Changes in both HD and
FD.
full-duplex and half-duplex datasets in a box-plot in Figure 13. For
FD Case I, the median, 1st quartile, 3rd quartile, lower whisker,
and upper whisker are 400, 248, 704, 57, and 1193, respectively. For
Case II, the median, 1st quartile, 3rd quartile, lower whisker, and
upper whisker are 522, 285, 843, 65, and 1546, respectively. For HD
Case I, the median, 1st quartile, 3rd quartile, lower whisker, and
upper whisker are 609, 419, 744, 85, and 1218, respectively. For Case
II, the median, 1st quartile, 3rd quartile, lower whisker, and upper
whisker are 360, 174, 617, 23, and 1026, respectively.
For a better understanding of the target change, we analyse site-
5. In our dataset, FD site 5 and HD site 5 is the same. We can see the
box-plot of the number of target change in Figure 14. The median
number of target changes for FD are 77 and 74 for Case I and Case
II, respectively. For HD, median number of target changes are 2 and
1 for Case I and Case II, respectively.
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